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Abstract 
We suggest a new approach to narrowing the field in elections, based on the 
deservingness of candidates to be contenders in a runoff, or to be declared one of several 
winners.  Instead of specifying some minimum percentage (e.g., 50) that the leading 
candidate must surpass to avoid a runoff (usually between the top two candidates), we 
propose that the number of contenders depend on the distribution of votes among 
candidates.  Divisor methods of apportionment proposed by Jefferson and Webster, 
among others, provide measures of deservingness, but they can prescribe a runoff even 
when one candidate receives more than 50 percent of the vote.   
We propose a new measure of deservingness, called the Next-Two rule, which 
compares the performance of candidates to the two that immediately follow them.  It 
never prescribes a runoff when one candidate receives more than 50 percent of the vote.  
More generally, it identifies as contenders candidates who are bunched together near the 
top and, unlike the Jefferson and Webster methods, never declares that all candidates are 
contenders.  We apply the Next-Two rule to several empirical examples, including one 
(elections to major league baseball’s Hall of Fame) in which more than one candidate can 
be elected.    
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Narrowing the Field in Elections: The Next-Two Rule1 
1.  Introduction 
In competitive elections with more than two candidates, it is often desirable to 
narrow the field to a few top contenders.  This is usually done by establishing a minimum 
percentage, which in different jurisdictions has been set at 50, 45, or 40, that the leading 
candidate must exceed in order to win outright.2  If no candidate achieves this threshold, 
then a runoff is held in which the top two, or sometimes more, candidates continue onto a 
next round of competition (Grofman, 2008).   
But why, as is usually the case, should only the top two candidates make the 
runoff?  If four candidates obtain 31, 30, 29, and 10 percent of the vote, should only the 
first two advance?  In this situation, it would seem sensible that the top three should do 
so. 
To be sure, limiting a runoff to the top two candidates ensures that one candidate 
will win a majority, except in the unlikely event of a tie, in the runoff.  But if the third-
place finisher is a centrist, sandwiched between a left and a right candidate, he or she may 
well be the Condorcet winner—able to defeat each of his or her opponents in separate 
pairwise contests—so there is little justification for eliminating him or her.3 
In this paper, we argue for a theoretically justified set of rules, which depend on 
the distribution of all votes, instead of rules that specify (i) a minimum percentage of the 
                                                
1 We thank Christian Klamler, Samuel Merrill III, and Scott Moser for their valuable comments on an 
earlier version of this paper. 
2 In its 1996 presidential election in Sierra Leone, the threshold was 55 percent (Bouton, 2011).  We know 
of no other instance of a threshold exceeding 50 percent.  
3 There is strong evidence that this was the case in the U.S. Senate race in New York in 1970, in which the 
centrist candidate, Charles E. Goodell, who received 24 percent of the vote, lost to James R. Buckley on his 
right, who received 39 percent, and Richard L. Ottinger on his left, who received 37 percent (Brams and 
Fishburn, 1983/2007, pp. 121-123).   
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vote that must be attained to win outright and (ii) a maximum number of candidates that 
are eligible to continue to the next round.  Our ideas apply not only to single-winner but 
also to multiwinner elections, including those in which the number of winners is not 
specified in advance.   
For example, to be elected to major league baseball’s Hall of Fame, a player must 
have been retired at least five, and at most twenty, years and be the choice of at least 75 
percent of the voters, who are professional sports writers who cover baseball.  The 
number of inductees varies from year to year, which seems justified because the list of 
eligible candidates changes from year to year.  Harder to justify is the arbitrariness of the 
75-percent threshold, which is attested to by the fact that some candidates who do not 
make the grade in their early years of eligibility make it later, though their performance 
statistics are unchanged. 
In section 2, we show how divisor methods of apportionment can be used to define 
the “deservingness” of candidates, just as they are used to determine the deservingness of 
U.S. states to receive the numbers of seats that they do in the House of Representatives—
and, analogously, for political parties to receive proportional representation in 
parliaments.  We focus on the two most commonly used divisor methods, originally 
proposed by Thomas Jefferson and Daniel Webster, and argue that both methods, 
especially in 3-candidate races, are not well suited to determining when there should be a 
runoff.  Among other reasons, each may call for a runoff even when one candidate 
receives more than 50 percent, and each may prescribe that all candidates should be in a 
runoff. 
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In section 3, we propose a new rule, which we call the “Next-Two rule,” which is 
based on a different principle.  The candidate with the most votes is always a 
“contender.”  If the sum of the votes of the candidate with the next-most votes and the 
candidate following him or her is at least equal to the leading candidate’s vote, then the 
candidate with the next-most votes is also a contender.  This rule for designating 
contenders extends to lower-ranked candidates, stopping only when the sum of the votes 
of the next two candidates is less than the vote of the candidate ahead of them.  We also 
consider an extension of this rule to more candidates, including the next three, and later a 
tightening of the Next-Two rule if more than one candidate can be elected (e.g., to 
baseball’s Hall of Fame).   
Next-Two tends to encourage lesser candidates not to drop out of a race, thereby 
fostering greater competition.  However, we show that it may produce either fewer or 
more contenders than the Jefferson and Webster methods, depending on the distribution 
of votes. 
In section 4, we apply the Next-Two rule to four empirical examples:  
1.  The 1824 presidential election, in which no candidate won a majority of 
electoral votes, so an election was held in the House of Representatives among the top 
three candidates.    
2.  The 1977 New York City Democratic mayoral primary, in which there were six 
candidates who received between 11 and 20 percent of the vote; it was decided by a 
runoff between the top two and then followed by a general election with multiple 
candidates.   
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3.  The 2008 Democratic presidential races in the Iowa caucuses and New 
Hampshire primary, which led to a rapid narrowing of the field. 
4.  The 2010 and 2011 elections to baseball’s Hall of Fame, in which one and two 
candidates, respectively, were elected. 
In section 5, we draw several conclusions.  Because of its iterative nature, we 
argue that the Next-Two rule is better able to select a subset of closely bunched 
candidates than the Webster or Jefferson methods, which may eliminate contenders 
within such a bunch.  Because a runoff may include more than two contenders under the 
Next-Two rule, we recommend that when this happens, approval voting be used to find 
the most acceptable candidate. 
2.  Divisor Methods of Apportionment 
Divisor methods of apportionment have been used for more than 200 years to 
assign seats in the U.S. House of Representatives to the states, based on their populations, 
and seats in parliaments to political parties, based on the votes they receive.  These 
methods ask: Which entity (e.g., state or political party) deserves the next seat to be 
awarded?  But they differ on how they define “deservingness.”4    
We ask a related question to determine which candidates are “contenders,” who 
have done well enough in an election that they deserve to become candidates in a runoff.  
But unlike seats that must be apportioned, we do not assume there is a prespecified 
number of contenders; instead, this number is determined endogenously.  We define 
                                                
4 Another commonly used apportionment method, proposed by Alexander Hamilton, does not award seats 
sequentially but instead all at once, according to each entity’s “quota,” or the exact number of seats to 
which it is entitled.  Under the Hamilton method, one cannot determine, at each step, the deservingness of 
entities to receive a seat, as one can under the divisor methods. 
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contenders to be the candidates who deserve first “seats,” according to an apportionment 
method, before any candidate deserves a second “seat.”  
Seats, as such, are not awarded to contenders.  Instead, a divisor apportionment 
method is used to determine whether the votes that a candidate receives entitle it to a first 
seat—were it a state or political party—before the leading candidate is entitled to a 
second seat.  In other words, does a candidate do “well enough,” compared to the leading 
candidate, to be considered a contender? 
Call the candidates c1, c2, c3, …, and suppose that the score of candidate ci is si.  
(The score of a candidate may be the number of votes received, or the percentage of the 
vote, or any appropriate measure of success in an election.)  Assume that the candidates 
are renumbered, if necessary, so that s1 ≥ s2 ≥ s3 ... .  Let S =  s1 + s2 + s3 + ... equal the 
total score of all candidates in the election.  Mostly we assume these scores are 
percentages of the total vote. 
The Webster and Jefferson methods allocate seats sequentially.  Suppose that, at 
some stage, the number of seats assigned to candidate ci is ai.  Then the allocation of the 
next seat is based on formulas that depend on the value of si and the current value of ai. 
Webster Method  
The next seat is assigned to a candidate, ci, who maximizes 5  For 
                                                
5 The 1/2 in the denominator of Wi reflects the rounding of fractions equal to or greater than 1/2 under the 
Webster method.  Under the Jefferson method, as we will see, the 1/2 is replaced by 1.  These constants, 
when added to ai in the denominators of Wi (and later Ji), lead to stable allocations: No transfer of one seat 
from one candidate to another reduces the inequality in representation among candidates, based on different 
measures of inequality.  The three divisor methods, in addition to those of Webster and Jefferson, that 
produce stable allocations are all based on different criteria of deservingness; all favor smaller parties in 
varying degrees (Balinski and Young, 2001; Marshall, Olkin and Pukelsheim, 2002).  Their deservingness 
measures (we drop the subscript i used in Wi and Ji) are s/[a(a + 1)]1/2 for Hill or “equal proportions,” 
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any candidate ci who has not yet received a seat, ai = 0, so Wi = 2si, whereas for any 
candidate ci who has already received one seat, Wi = 2si/3.  Because all candidates begin 
with ai = 0 seats, candidate c1 is the first candidate to be allocated a seat.  Thus, a 
contender is any candidate ck for whom sk ≥ s1/3.     
Example 1.  (s1, s2, s3) = (45, 35, 20).  Because s3 > s1/3 = 15, all three candidates are 
contenders according to the Webster method. 
Example 2.  (s1, s2, s3) = (57, 22, 21).  Because s3 > s1/3 = 19, it again follows that all 
three candidates are contenders according to the Webster method.  But note that 
candidate c1 receives more than 50 percent of the vote in this example. 
Proposition 1.  Under the Webster method, there are at most  contenders. 
Proof.  Suppose there are exactly k contenders.  Then 
S = s1 + s2 + … ≥ s1 + s2 + …+ sk ≥ s1 + (k – 1)(s1/3) =  
from which k ≤   The result follows because k must be an integer.   
Corollary 1.  If s1 > S/2, then there are at most 3 contenders. 
                                                                                                                                            
s/[(2a(a + 1)/(2a + 1)] for Dean or “harmonic mean,” and s/a for Adams or “smallest divisors.”  Whereas 
the Webster method (also known as Sainte-Laguë) is used in four Scandinavian countries, and the Jefferson 
method  (also known as d’Hondt) in 18 other countries, none of the other three divisor methods is used, 
with the exception of the Hill or equal-proportions method, that is currently used to apportion seats to states 
in the U.S. House of Representatives.  The nondivisor Hamilton method, also called “largest remainders” 
(see note 2), is used in nine countries (Blais and Massicotte, 2002; Cox, 1997). 
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Examples 2 shows that the upper bound of Corollary 1 can be achieved.  If s1 = 
S/2, then the upper bound of Corollary 1 must be increased by 1.  For example, if (s1, s2, 
s3, s4) = (30, 10, 10, 10), then all four candidates are contenders, according to the Webster 
method.       
Similar corollaries can be obtained using other fractions.  For instance, it is easy to 
show from Proposition 1 that if s1 > S/3,  there are at most 6 contenders.  
Jefferson Method  
The next seat is assigned to a candidate, ci, who maximizes   For a 
candidate ci who has not yet received a seat, Ji = si, whereas for any candidate ci who has 
already received a seat, Ji = si/2.  As with the Webster method, all candidates begin with 
ai = 0 seats, so candidate c1 receives the first seat.  Thus, a contender is any candidate ck 
for whom sk ≥ s1/2.   
Example 1.  (s1, s2, s3) = (45, 35, 20).  Because s3 < s1/2 = 22.5 ≤ s2, it follows that only 
candidates c1 and c2 are contenders according to the Jefferson method (recall that all three 
candidates were contenders under the Webster method). 
Example 2.  (s1, s2, s3) = (57, 22, 21).  Because s3 < s2 < s1/2 = 28.5, it follows that only 
candidate c1 is a contender according to the Jefferson method (recall that all three 
candidates were contenders under the Webster method). 
Proposition 2.  Under the Jefferson method, there are at most  
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contenders. 
Proof.  Suppose there are exactly k contenders.  Then  
S = s1 + s2 + … ≥ s1 + s2 + …+ sk ≥ s1 + (k – 1)(s1/2) =   
from which k ≤   The result follows because k must be an integer.   
Corollary 2.  If  s1 > S/2, then there are at most 2 contenders. 
The example, (s1, s2, s3) = (65, 34, 1), shows that the upper bound in Corollary 2 
can be achieved, even though c1 receives almost twice as many votes as c2.  If s1 = S/2, 
then the upper bound in Corollary 2 must be increased by 1.  For example, if (s1, s2, s3) = 
(50, 25, 25), then all three candidates are contenders according to the Jefferson method.   
Similar corollaries can be obtained using other scores.  For instance, it is easy to 
show from Proposition 2 that when s1 > S/3,  there are at most 4 contenders.  
To summarize, if the score of the leading candidate exceeds 50 percent, there can 
be up to three contenders under the Webster method and up to two under the Jefferson 
method (Corollaries 1 and 2).6  In the case of the Webster method, such a candidate can 
receive more than twice the score of any other contender yet be faced with a runoff 
(Example 2); under the Jefferson method, there can be three contenders only if the score 
of the leading candidate is at most equal to double the scores of the other contenders, as 
                                                
6 The well-known Laaski-Taagepera (1979) index of the “effective number of parties,” if used as a measure 
of the number of contenders, can also indicate there to be more than two contenders if one candidate 
receives more than 50 percent of the vote (see Feld and Grofman, 2007, for a different interpretation of this 
index).  Thus in Example 2, this index, which is defined as , has a value of 2.4, suggesting 
there to be at least two contenders when the leading candidate receives 57 percent of the vote and the next-
leading candidates less than half as much (22 percent).  Because of such nonintutive results in the 
identification of significant parties (or, in our case, serious contenders), Taagepera (2005) proposed this 
index be supplemented, but not replaced, by an “index of balance,” which can vary between 0 and 1; it does 
not seem to have a ready interpretation in the identification of contenders.   
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illustrated by the (50, 25, 25) example.  
The Webster method, which allows for up to three contenders even when one 
candidate’s score exceeds 50 percent, is more lenient than the Jefferson method.  (The 
three other divisor methods described in note 3 are even more lenient, allowing still 
weaker candidates to be contenders.)  Because we know of no voting system in public 
elections that fails to elect the leading candidate if he or she obtains a majority of the vote 
(we will give an example in section 4 where this is not the case in a private election), we 
henceforth do not consider the Webster and Jefferson methods as narrowing-down 
methods—except to compare them with the Next-Two rule and a related rule in section 3.  
To include all candidates in a runoff, as can happen under all the divisor methods, 
is tantamount to repeating the election.  As we will see, the Next-Two rule never allows 
this.  The lowest-scoring candidate in an election is always eliminated, but there is a cost 
for this certainty: There is no guarantee that a Condorcet winner always qualifies as a 
contender (see note 3).7  
3.  The Next-Two Rule 
Definition 
  Like the Webster, Jefferson, and other divisor methods, the Next-Two rule makes 
deservingness the criterion to be a contender.  The Next-Two rule is applied to the 
candidates in sequence, until it identifies a candidate who is not a contender; then it stops.  
As before, suppose that the candidates are c1, c2, … cn.  Formally, the procedure is 
as follows: 
                                                
7 No narrowing-down procedure based on vote totals, including those of Webster and Jefferson, can 
preclude this possibility, because a Condorcet winner is defined in terms of the preferences of voters, not 
the numbers of votes they receive.  In particular, it is always possible that a Condorcet winner receives the 
fewest votes when preferences are not taken into account. 
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(1) Candidate c1 is always a contender. 
(2) If 2 ≤ h < n, and if candidates c2, c3, … ch - 1 are contenders, then candidate ch is 
a contender if and only if sh - 1 ≤ sh + sh + 1—that is, the sum of the scores of the 
two candidates below candidate ch - 1 is greater or equal to this candidate’s 
score.  
While candidate c1 is always a contender, candidate cn never is, so the Next-Two rule 
always eliminates at least one candidate.  
We next illustrate the Next-Two rule with several examples, comparing it with the 
Jefferson and Webster methods and proving a number of propositions.  We do this first 
for elections with exactly three candidates, showing graphically when each procedure 
prescribes two or three (in the case of the Jefferson and Webster methods) contenders.  
Then we extend the analysis to four or more candidates.  
Elections with n = 3 Candidates 
Consider the examples we presented earlier: 
Example 1.  (s1, s2, s3) = (45, 35, 20).  Because s2 + s3 ≥ s1, it follows that 
candidates c1 and c2 are contenders according to the Next-Two rule, coinciding with those 
given by the Jefferson method.  The Webster method makes all three candidates 
contenders. 
Example 2.  (s1, s2, s3) = (57, 22, 21).  Because  s1 > s2 + s3, it follows that only candidate 
c1 is a contender, which again agrees with the Jefferson method.  And once again, the 
Webster method makes all three candidates contenders. 
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To gain more insight into similarities and differences in the three procedures, for 
convenience we rename candidates c1, c2, and c3 to be candidates A, B, and C, 
respectively.  Their fractional shares of the votes are x = s1/S,  y = s2/S, and z = s3/S.   
The Next-Two rule prescribes that both candidates A and B are contenders if and 
only if y + z ≥ x; otherwise, the only contender is candidate A.  Note that x + y + z = 1.  
Then an equivalent way to state the Next-Two rule is that candidate B is a contender if 
and only if  
y + (1 – x – y) ≥ x,  
which is equivalent to x ≤ 1/2.8   
Thus, if candidate A receives more than 50 percent of the vote, then he or she is the 
only contender—and the outright winner of the election—and there will be no runoff.  
The theoretical justification for this requirement is that candidate B must at least be able 
to tie candidate A if (i) candidate C drops out and (ii) all of candidate C’s supporters shift 
their support to candidate B.  
Graphical Analysis 
To obtain a more precise idea of how the Next-Two rule compares with the 
Jefferson and Webster methods for determining deservingness, we compare the regions in 
the x-y plane in which each procedure prescribes a runoff between two or three (in the 
                                                
8 A “double complement rule” proposed by Shugart and Taagepera (1994) also requires that x ≤ 50.  Their 
rule compares the performance of candidate A to that of candidate B by requiring that x > y/2 + 25 for the 
A to be the outright winner; otherwise, there will be a runoff between A and B.  To illustrate, if x = 40, the 
candidate A will be the outright winner if candidate B receives y < 30, whereas if y ≥ 30, both A and B will 
be contenders, leading to a runoff.  Although this seems a reasonable rule to determine whether candidate B 
performs well enough to force a 2-candidate runoff, it does not address the question of how many 
additional candidates can qualify as contenders—and so be in a runoff—as do divisor methods and the 
Next-Two rule.     
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case of the Jefferson and Webster methods) candidates.  For three candidates, this can be 
done graphically. 
The fractions x, y, and z can be assumed to be non-negative and satisfy certain 
additional conditions.  First, x + y + z = 1, or z = 1 – x – y, because there are only three 
candidates.  Also, because of the assumed order of finish, x ≥ y ≥ z.  In particular, note 
that y ≥ z is equivalent to y ≥ 1 – x – y, or 1 – x – 2y ≤ 0.   
Combining these inequalities produces a triangle in the x-y plane that contains all 
possible 3-candidate elections.  This triangle, shown in Figure 1, has vertices (1, 0), (1/2, 
1/2), and (1/3, 1/3).  The area of the triangle can be calculated by noting that it is a right  
triangle, with the right angle at (1/2, 1/2).  The side from (1/2, 1/2) to (1, 0) has length 
/2, and the side from (1/2, 1/2) to (1/3, 1/3) has length /6, so the area of the 
triangle is 1/2 × /2 × /6 = 1/12.  
 
Figure 1.  Shaded Triangle Contains All 3-Candidate Elections in Which the Vote 
Fractions of Candidates A, B, and C Are x, y, and z  = 1 – x – y 
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The regions requiring runoffs, according to the Next-Two rule and both the 
Jefferson and Webster methods, are located inside this triangle, which is shown in Figure 
2.  The lighter-shaded regions indicate a runoff between two contenders, whereas the 
darker-shaded areas (for the Jefferson and Webster methods only) indicate a runoff 
among three contenders.  For the Next-Two rule, as we showed earlier, there are a 
maximum of two contenders. 
 
Figure 2.  Regions Requiring Runoffs: Lighter-Shaded Regions Indicate a Runoff 
between Two Contenders, and Darker-Shaded Regions a Runoff among Three 
Contenders 
Next-Two Rule 
The Next-Two Rule requires a runoff if and only if x ≤ y + z.  As noted earlier, this 
condition is equivalent to x ≤ 1/2, which is to say that candidate A does not receive a 
majority.  The lighter-shaded triangle in Figure 2(a) shows this region and has vertices 
(1/2, 1/2), (1/3, 1/3), and (1/2, 1/4).  To calculate its area, note that the distance from (1/3, 
1/3) to (1/2, 1/4) is /12, whereas the distance from (1/3, 1/3) to (1, 0) is /3.  
Therefore, the area of the Next-Two triangle is 1/4 of the area of the triangle in Figure 1, 
or 1/48.  If all possible values (x, y) are assumed to be equiprobable, this calculation 
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implies a 2-candidate runoff in 1/4 of all elections under the Next-Two rule.  
Jefferson Method 
There are three contenders if x/2 ≤ z/1.  Substituting z = 1 – x – y produces the 
condition 2 − 3x − 2y ≥ 0, which is the darker-shaded triangle in Figure 2(b).  This region 
has vertices (1/3, 1/3), (1/2, 1/4), and (2/3, 2/5).  To calculate its area, note that the 
distance from (1/3, 1/3) to (2/5, 2/5) is /15, whereas, as already noted, the distance 
from (1/3, 1/3) to (1/2, 1/2 ) is /6.  Therefore, the area of this region is 2/5 of the area 
of the Next-Two triangle in Figure 2(a) and so equals 1/120. 
There are two contenders if z < x/2 ≤ y, which defines the lighter-shaded region in 
Figure 2(b) (adjacent to the darker-shaded triangle).  The part of the quadrilateral that 
overlaps the Next-Two region is 3/5 of the area of the Next-Two triangle in Figure 2(a) 
and so equals 1/80.  The remainder of the quadrilateral is in the region in which x > 1/2, 
wherein candidate A receives more than 50 percent of the vote.  
Webster Method 
As with the Jefferson method, there may be either two or three contenders in a 
runoff.  We do not give the details here, but Figure 3(c) makes clear that whether there 
are three contenders (darker-shaded triangle) or two (lighter-shaded remainder of the 
quarilateral), candidate A can receive more than 50 percent of the vote. 
Comparisons for n = 3 Candidates 
The foregoing analysis proves the following proposition:  
Proposition 3.  If there are three candidates, the conditions for a runoff are 
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strictest for the Next-Two rule, followed by the Jefferson method and then the Webster 
method.  Whereas the Next-Two rule always specifies a maximum of two contenders, both 
the Jefferson and Webster method allow for three contenders.  However, only the 
Webster method allows for three contenders if candidate A receives more than 50 percent 
of the vote.    
Because a runoff among three contenders would be just a rerun of the original 
election, runoffs under the Jefferson and Webster methods could be restricted to the top 
two candidates, even when they prescribe three contenders.  Given this restriction, 
however, each method still allows a runoff when candidate A receives more than 50 
percent of the vote, which seems uncalled for to choose a winner, the case of Sierra 
Leone notwithstanding (see note 2).   
Elections with n ≥ 4 Candidates 
Both the Next-Two rule, and the Jefferson and Webster methods, are easy to apply 
when there are more than three candidates.  Recall that to assess the deservingness of 
candidates B, C, and subsequent candidates under the Jefferson or Webster methods, the 
candidate’s score is compared to the score of candidate A.  To assess the deservingness of 
a candidate under the Next-Two rule, the candidate’s score, plus the score of the 
subsequent candidate, is compared to the preceding candidate’s score.   
Thus, the Next-Two rule has a moving yardstick, whereas the Jefferson and 
Webster rules have a fixed yardstick.  But the Next-Two rule has an additional 
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requirement: A candidate cannot be judged deserving unless all the preceding candidates 
(whose scores are at least as high) are also judged deserving.9 
Example 3.  (s1, s2, s3, s4) = (31, 30, 29, 10), which was our original example.  Here the 
Next-Two rule, and the Jefferson and Webster methods, all prescribe the top three 
candidates (A, B, and C) to be contenders, leaving out only candidate D.  The Next-Three 
rule (see note 7) also shows these candidates to be the contenders. 
Example 4.  (s1, s2, s3, s4) = (42, 22, 19, 17).  According to the Next-Two rule, the only 
contender is candidate A.  According to the Jefferson method and the Next-Three rule, 
the contenders are candidates A and B.  According to the Webster method, all four 
candidates are contenders. 
Example 5.  (s1, s2, s3, s4) = (50, 48, 1, 1).  According to the Next-Two rule, the only 
contender is candidate A.  According to the Jefferson and Webster methods as well as the 
Next-Three rule, the contenders are candidates A and B.   
In both Examples 4 and 5, the Next-Two rule gives a different result from all the 
other procedures.  Whereas candidate A stands apart from the other candidates in 
Example 4, it might seem less justifiable to single him or her out in Example 5.  
                                                
9 If there are four or more candidates, a less stringent rule would be the Next-Three rule, whereby candidate 
B is a contender if the sum of the votes of the candidates B, C, and D is at least equal to the number of 
votes of the candidate A.  Note that the Next-Two rule requires that, to be a contender, candidate B must 
get at least 1/2 as many votes as candidate A, whereas the Next-Three rule requires that candidate B get at 
least 1/3 as many.  Next-Three could be extended to all remaining candidates, which would be even more 
lenient in permitting contenders; more restrictive would be to require that all remaining candidates must 
beat the frontrunner instead of the candidate just ahead of them.  In fact, both these rules give the same 
contenders as does Next-Two if there are three candidates, but not if there are more than three. We focus on 
Next-Two subsequently because of (i) its simplicity, (ii) its flexibility in allowing fewer or more contenders 
than the Webster and Jefferson methods (Propositions 4 and 5), and (iii) the inducement it gives to 
nonleading candidates to encourage the next-lower candidate to stay in a race (Proposition 6), thereby 
increasing competitiveness.   
 19 
However, note in this example that candidates B, C, and D, even together, do not receive 
more votes than candidate A, so it seems quite defensible to make candidate A, who is 
just short of a majority, the sole contender.   
If the Next-Two rule and the Jefferson and Webster methods indicate a different 
number of contenders, is the Next-Two rule always more selective (as it is in the 3-
candidate case, when the Jefferson and Webster methods prescribe three contenders but 
the Next-Two rule at most two)?  Propositions 5 and 6 show that the answer is “no.” 
Proposition 4.  The Next-Two rule can select more contenders than the Jefferson 
method if and only if there are four or more candidates.  
Proof.  To show that this proposition does not hold if there are three candidates, 
see Figure 2.  To show next that the Next-Two rule can prescribe a larger number of 
contenders than the Jefferson method, consider the following example: 
Example 6.  (s1, s2, s3, s4) = (45, 24, 22, 9).  Because 24 + 22 ≥ 45, candidate B is a 
contender under the Next-Two rule.  Because B is, so is candidate C, since 22 + 9 ≥ 24.  
Consequently, candidates A, B, and C are all contenders under the Next-Two rule.  But 
under the Jefferson method, only candidates A and B are contenders since candidate C 
receives less than 1/2 the support of A.  This example can readily be extended to 
examples with more than four candidates.   
Thus, neither the Next-Two rule nor the Jefferson method necessarily prescribes fewer 
(or more) contenders than the other procedure when there are at least four candidates.  
Proposition 5.  The Next-Two rule can select more contenders than the Webster 
method if and only if there are five or more candidates.  
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Proof.  To show that this proposition does not hold if there are four candidates, 
return to the (x, y, z, w) notation for the score fractions of the players, and suppose that (x, 
y, z, w) produces more contenders under the Next-Two rule than under Webster method.  
If the only contender under Webster method is candidate A, then we have y < x/3.  But y 
≥ z, so y + z < 2x/3 < x; hence, the Next-Two rule also prescribes that the only contender 
is candidate A.   
Now suppose that Webster method produces candidates A and B as contenders.  
Then y ≥ x/3 while w ≤ z < x/3.   In order for the Next-Two rule to produce candidates A, 
B, and C as contenders, we must have y + z ≥ x and z + w ≥ y.  But the first condition 
implies that y ≥ x − z  > 2x/3, which in turn means that z + w ≤ 2z < 2x/3 < y, 
contradicting the second condition.  Therefore, if the Webster method produces a runoff 
between candidates A and B, the Next-Two rule cannot produce a runoff among 
candidates A, B, and C. 
To show next that the Next-Two rule can prescribe a larger runoff than the 
Webster method, consider the following example: 
Example 7.  (s1, s2, s3, s4, s5) = (40, 22, 19, 10, 9).  It is easy to verify that candidates A, B, 
C, and D are all contenders under the Next-Two rule.  But under the Webster method, 
only candidates A, B, and C are contenders since candidate D receives fewer than 1/3 the 
votes of candidate A.  This example can readily be extended to examples with more than 
five candidates.    
Taken together, Propositions 4 and 5 show that, given a sufficient number of candidates, 
the Next-Two rule is neither more nor less selective than the Jefferson or Webster 
methods. 
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Proposition 6.  Under the Next-Two rule, if any nonleading candidate drops out 
and if his or her votes are either lost or distributed proportionately to the other 
candidates, then no noncontender can become a contender.   
Proof.  Suppose that, initially, candidates c1, c2, c3, … ch - 1 are contenders and 
candidate ch is not, where h < n.  It must be the case that sh - 1 > sh + sh + 1.  If nonleading 
candidate j drops out, then the vote counts can be considered to be s1, s2, … sn, with sj 
missing.  If j < h, the contenders will be c1, c2, … cj - 1 if sj - 1 > sj + 1 + sj + 2, or  c1, c2, … ch - 1 
otherwise.  If j ≥ h, the contenders will remain c1, c2, c3, … ch - 1, because it will still be the 
case that sh - 1 is strictly greater than the sum of the vote counts of the two candidates 
immediately following candidate ch - 1, one of whom—if j = h or j = h + 1—will be 
replaced by an even lower -scoring candidate.   
We conclude that the Next-Two rule gives nonleading candidates an incentive to 
encourage candidates below them not to drop out.   
Example 6 illustrates Proposition 6.  If the 22-candidate drops out, the 24-
candidate will no longer be a contender.  Likewise, if the 9-candidate drops out, the 22-
candidate will no longer be a contender.  Thus, nonleading candidates have an incentive 
to encourage the next-lower candidate to stay in the race, because they can lose  their 
contender status if he or she drops out.  (This is not true of the Webster or Jefferson 
methods, because a contender’s status does not depend on whether another candidate 
stays in or drops out but only on his or her votes compared to those of the leading 
candidate.)  Thus, Next-Two fosters competition, because every candidate—except for 
the leading candidate, whose contender status does not depend on lesser candidates—will 
be encouraged by the next-higher candidate to stay in the race. 
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In section 5 we apply the Next-Two rule to a several empirical examples, in all of 
which there were at least two contenders.  In the last example, more than one candidate 
can be elected.  For this example, we suggest a possible modification to the Next-Two 
rule to make the choice of contenders more selective.     
4.  Empirical Examples 
1824 Presidential Election 
This is the only U.S. presidential election in which, based on  electoral votes, there 
were two contenders, and almost a third, according to the Next-Two rule:10  
 
Candidates Andrew 
Jackson 
John Quincy 
Adams 
William H. 
Crawford 
Henry 
Clay 
Elect. Votes 99 (38%) 84 (32%) 41 (16%) 37 (14%) 
 
The Next-Two rule fails to make Crawford a contender, because the sum of his votes and 
Clay’s votes (78) are fewer than Adams’s votes (84)—but not by much. 
Because no candidate won a majority (131) of the 261 electoral votes, the election 
was thrown into the House of Representatives, which the Twelfth Amendment (1804) 
prescribes must not exceed three candidates.11  The Twelfth Amendment also prescribes 
                                                
10 If popular votes were the measure of performance, then there was one presidential election in which 
there were three contenders.  In 1912, the top four candidates were Woodrow Wilson (42 percent), 
Theodore Roosevelt (27 percent), William Howard Taft (23 percent), and Eugene Debs (6 percent), with 
less than 2 percent going to lesser candidates.  According to the Next-Two rule, the top three candidates 
were contenders and, hence, should compete in a runoff.  But because Wilson won a majority of electoral 
votes (82 percent), this election, unlike that of 1824, never went to the House of Representatives.  This was 
also true of the 2000 election, but only after George W. Bush was awarded all of Florida’s electoral votes 
on December 12.  In the two other elections in which no candidate received a majority of electoral votes 
initially, one was decided in the House (1800) and the other by a specially appointed commission (1876), 
but each of these involved only two contenders. 
11 It is noteworthy that the Founding Fathers recognized that a runoff need not be between just the top two 
candidates, even though this is the norm, almost without exception, today.  It is also noteworthy that in one 
earlier presidential election—that of 1800—it took 36 ballots in the House of Representatives before one of 
the two contenders, Thomas Jefferson, defeated the other, John Adams (who had previously been 
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that each of the  states (there were 24 at the time) cast one vote in the House, so state 
delegations had to decide, usually by a majority vote within the state delegation, how 
they would cast their single vote in the House election.  
The question in this election became which contender the eliminated candidate, 
Clay, would favor (he won 3 states; Crawford won 4, Jackson 7, and Adams 10).12  Clay, 
who detested Jackson, threw his support to Adams in the so-called corrupt bargain (Clay 
became the secretary of state under Adams), giving Adams exactly the 13 votes he 
needed to win with a bare majority of the 24 votes.13   
1977 New York City Democratic Mayoral Primary and General Election 
In the 1977 New York City Democratic mayoral primary, there were six major 
candidates, five of whom are contenders according to the Next-Two rule: 
 
Candidates Edward I. 
Koch 
Mario 
Cuomo 
Abraham 
D. Beame 
Bella 
Abzug 
Percy 
Sutton 
Herman 
Badillo 
% Votes 19.8 18.7 18.0 16.6 14.4 11.0 
 
A scattering of the remaining votes (2.6 percent) went to other candidates, but these—
combined with Badillo’s 11.0 percent—would fail to make Badillo a contender. 
Rarely, of course, are there so many contenders, whichever narrowing procedure is 
used, which raises the question of what voting procedure should be used to select a 
winner in a crowded runoff (we will return to this question in the concluding section).  In 
                                                                                                                                            
president).  A resolution of this election was complicated by the votes cast for each party’s vice-presidential 
candidates.    
12 Note that if Clay were able to be a candidate in the House, Crawford would be a contender according to 
the Next-Two rule, because the sum of his votes and Clay’s (7) equals Jackson’s total. 
13 For two different rational-choice explanations of why the states that Clay controlled went for Adams 
over Jackson—apart from Clay’s endorsement of Adams and the possibility of a corrupt bargain between 
them—see Riker (1962, pp. 149-158) and Brams (1978/2007, pp. 158-166/108-114). 
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the actual runoff between the top two candidates two weeks after the primary, Koch beat 
Cuomo 55-45 percent.   
Six weeks later Koch won the general election with 49.99 percent of the vote, 
beating Cuomo, who chose to run again as the Liberal party nominee and who received 
40.97 percent of the vote; a Republican and a Conservative party candidate trailed far 
behind, each obtaining about 4 percent.  This time, however, even though Koch failed to 
win a majority, he became the winner since there was no provision for a runoff in the 
general election.    
2008 Presidential Election: Democratic Races in Iowa Caucuses and New 
Hampshire Primary 
The main contestants in these two races were Barack Obama (O), Hillary Clinton 
(C), John Edwards (E), and John Richardson (R).  On January 3 in Iowa, (O, C, E, R) 
received (38, 30, 29, 2) percent of the votes in the caucuses, leaving only 1 percent for 
other candidates.  Under the Next-Two rule, Obama, Clinton, and Edwards are the 
contenders.   
In fact, all four candidates continued onto New Hampshire, which had a primary 
on January 8.  The returns there were (C, O, E, R) = (39, 36, 17, 5) percent of the votes, 
leaving 3 percent for minor candidates.  In this election, the Next-Two rule shows only 
Clinton and Obama to be the contenders.   
Richardson dropped out after New Hampshire, whereas Edwards continued for 
three more weeks, after which he “suspended” his campaign after doing poorly in 
caucuses and primaries in four more states.  While both candidates held out somewhat 
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longer than predicted by the Next-Two rule, the reality of their nearly hopeless situations 
eventually pushed both out of the race.  
Major League Baseball of Fame 
As we indicated in section 1, entry into major league baseball’s Hall of Fame 
requires the support of at least 75 percent of the voters, who are at least 10-year veterans 
of the Baseball Writers Association of America (BBWAA).  The ballot includes players 
who (i) retired not more than 20 years earlier, were candidates from the previous year’s 
ballot, and received at least 5 percent of the vote on that ballot but were not elected and 
(ii) selected players, chosen by a screening committee, who retired exactly five years 
earlier.  Each writer can vote for a maximum of 10 candidates. 
In the balloting for 2011, there were 581 voters, who cast an average of 5.98 votes.  
Two candidates, Roberto Alomar and Bert Blyleven, were elected with the support of 
90.0 and 79.7 percent of voters, respectively (Baseball Hall of Fame Balloting, 2010, 
2011).   
Curiously, Alomar and Blyleven just missed the 75-percent mark in the 2010 
election, obtaining, respectively, 73.7 and 74.2 percent.  They were bested that year by 
one player, Andre Dawson, who was supported by 77.9 percent and was the only player 
elected in 2010 (Dawson had previously failed to attain 75 percent in 2008 and 2009).  In 
rare elections, the most recent being 1996, no players have been elected.  
Instead of assuming that players must reach the 75-percent mark, consider what the 
Next-Two rule would prescribe.  In 2011, 14 players would have been elected; the 14th 
player, who received 11.7 percent support, was the first player to receive a higher 
percentage than the combined percentages of the two players that followed him (with 6.1 
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and 4.1 percent, respectively), thereby precluding any lower-ranked players from being 
contenders.  In 2010, the top 16 players would have made the grade, with the 16th player 
obtaining 11.0 percent support.   
In making these projections for 2010 and 2011, we assumed that the voting 
behavior of BBWAA members would not have changed if the Next-Two rule had been in 
place.  But surely it would have, assuming that most members do not consider 14-16 new 
players worthy of membership in the Hall of Fame.   
Might the Next-Two rule be modified to allow for admission of only a few of the 
most deserving players?  At the same time, might the modified procedure solve the 
“problem” of 2010, when only one player was elected but two others, based on their 
support, were almost as deserving? 
In particular, it seems unfair that only Dawson (77.9 percent)—and not also 
Blyleven (74.2 percent) or Alomar (73.7 percent)—was elected when the 4th candidate 
(Jack Morris, with 52.3 percent) was far below the top three vote-getters, who were 
separated by less than 5 percentage points.  To be sure, the apparent injustice to Blyleven 
and Alomar in 2010 was rectified by their election in 2011, but it seems preferable to 
have a procedure that, when it elects one player, also elects others who get nearly as 
much support.  On the other hand, when one player stands out by getting far more support 
than any others, shouldn’t he alone be elected? 
Clearly, the Next-Two rule, by electing 16 and 14 players in 2010 and 2011 if the 
voting behavior of the voters had not changed, would not have done this.  Can it be made 
more selective?  We suggest that instead of assuming that the sum of the votes of 
candidates B and C must at least equal the votes of candidate A in order that B be a 
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contender, assume that a fraction  < 1 of this sum is at least equal to the vote of 
candidate A.  
 To illustrate in 2010, for the top triple,  
[74.2 (Blyleven) + 73.7 (Alomar)] ≥ 77.9 (Dawson),          (1) 
or  ≥ 0.53, in order for Blyleven to be a contender after Dawson, who received more 
than 75 percent support, is elected.  For the next triple,  
[73.7 (Alomar) + 52.3 (Morris)](k)  ≥ 74.2 (Blyleven),          (2) 
or  ≥ 0.59, in order for Alomar to be a contender when Blyleven is.  And for the next 
triple,  
[52.3 (Morris) + 47.3 (Lee Smith)] ≥ 73.7 (Alomar),          (3) 
or  ≥ 0.74, in order for Morris to be a contender when Alomar is.  Inequalities (1) and 
(2) show that the 2nd and 3rd candidates in 2010—all of whom received more than 70 
percent support, but only one of whom passed the threshold of 75 percent—would have 
made the grade if  = 0.59, but the 4th candidate, Morris, who was considerably lower at 
52.3 percent, would not have, because  ≥ 0.74 is necessary in order to satisfy inequality 
(3).   
Raising 0.59 to 0.60 for simplicity, we define a “60 percent” Next-Two rule, using 
the 2010 election as an example.  When  = 0.60, then inequalities (1) and (2) are 
satisfied, but (3) is not, so the top three candidates would be elected.   
Contrast this result with one in which the leading candidate receives 100 percent 
support, which in fact has never happened (99 percent support has been achieved only a 
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few times).  If Dawson came in second with the 77.9 percent—the amount he actually 
received—and Blyleven had followed suit, then Dawson would not have made the grade, 
because  
(0.60)[77.9 (Dawson) + 74.2 (Blyleven)] = 91.3 < 100. 
In this case, only the 100-percent candidate would have been elected, because the gap 
that separates him from the next two candidates is too great.   
More generally, assume that major league baseball retains the 75 percent threshold, 
but only for the election of the top vote-getter.  Given his election, assume it uses the “60 
percent” Next-Two rule—or some other value of  < 1—to determine who else, if 
anybody, is also elected.  Other players would then be elected if they did almost as well 
as the top player, as happened in 2010, but no others would be elected if they didn’t come 
close, as in our preceding example in which only the top player, with 100 percent 
support, would have been elected.    
The modified Next-Two rule, because of its iterative nature, recognizes the 
closeness of players like Blyleven and Alomar in 2010 and selects both.  By the same 
token, it recognizes the disparity between Dawson and a hypothetical 100 percent player 
and would select only the 100 percent player.  On the other hand, the Webster and 
Jefferson methods, by asking whether candidates are within 1/3 or 1/2 of the percentage 
support of the top player (at or above 75 percent), would elect candidates just above this 
mark but not candidates just below it.  
When more than one candidate, such as to baseball’s Hall of Fame, can be elected, 
the Next-Two rule takes better account of the distribution of top players than any of the 
divisor methods of apportionment.  Because Next-Two rule is iterative, it stops selection 
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when there is a substantial gap in the distribution, whereas the divisor methods set the 
deservingness threshold without regard to gaps between adjacent players, because only 
the top candidate’s performance is the standard. 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
We suggested a new approach to narrowing the field in elections, based on the 
deservingness of candidates to be contenders.  Instead of specifying in advance the 
number of candidates to be in a runoff (usually two) if the leading candidate does not 
surpass a particular percentage (usually 50), we proposed that the number in the runoff 
depend on the distribution of votes among candidates.  If one candidate stands well above 
the others, he or she should be the sole contender, but if there are two or more candidates 
who are bunched together at or near the top, most or all should be contenders.  
The apportionment methods of Webster and Jefferson are based on different 
measures of deservingness.   We rejected both methods in the end, because they allow 
candidate B to be a contender even if (i) candidate A receives more than 50 percent of the 
vote or (ii) this percentage is twice or thrice as much as that received by each of the other 
candidates.  
The procedure we introduced that was not an apportionment method, the Next-
Two rule, uses an iterative criterion to determine contenders.  Starting with the top triple 
of candidates, the sum of the votes of candidates B and C must be at least equal to the 
vote of candidate A for B to be a contender.  When, for some triple, this chain is broken 
as one goes down the list of candidates, then no additional candidates are contenders.    
This rule allows for at most n – 1 contenders if there are n candidates.  Thus, if 
there are three candidates, at most two can be contenders, whereas the Webster and 
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Jefferson methods can permit all three candidates to be contenders, which would mean 
just a rerun of the original election. 
Although the Jefferson and Webster methods allow for more contenders than the 
Next-Two rule if there are three candidates, this result is not general.  The Next-Two rule 
can select more contenders than the Jefferson and Webster methods if and only if there 
are at least four (Jefferson) or five (Webster) candidates.  Thus, given a sufficient number 
of candidates, the Next-Two rule is neither more nor less selective than the Jefferson or 
Webster methods.  It also induces candidates to discourage lesser candidates from 
dropping out, making races more competitive.  
In effect, apportionment methods use only the performance of the top candidate as 
a yardstick—do other candidates receive at least some fraction as many votes as he or she 
does?  The Next-Two rule compares the performance of a candidate to the two below him 
or her—can the latter, together, defeat him or her?  We indicated that the Next-Two rule 
could be loosened to allow for more lower-ranked candidates (e.g., the next three), whose 
supporters, combined, would be able to defeat the next-higher candidate.  
If there are more than two contenders in a runoff, it is possible that no candidate 
will win a majority and, hence, become the outright winner according to the Next-Two 
rule.  In this case, we recommend that approval voting (Brams and Fishburn, 1983/2007; 
Brams, 1978/2007, 2008) be used in the runoff (it could be used in the initial election as 
well) to increase the probability that the leading candidate wins a majority in the runoff.14  
                                                
14 Assuming that votes of eliminated candidates are lost or distributed proportionately, repeatedly applying 
the Next-Two rule to a diminishing set of contenders eventually makes the leading candidate the winner.  
Thus, its repeated use is not effective in choosing other than the plurality winner.  Instead, it is better used 
to identify a set of contenders at the outset.  If there are more than two, then some other procedure (e.g., 
approval voting) can be used to choose a winner—or perhaps several winners—from amongst the 
contenders.   
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Winning majority approval, or the greatest majority approval if two or more candidates 
are majority-approved, would enhance the legitimacy of the leading candidate’s victory. 
Our empirical examples illustrated how the Next-Two rule would have worked in 
some presidential elections, including a presidential caucus and a presidential primary.  A 
mayoral primary showed how it would have somewhat narrowed the field, in which case 
approval voting would seem an appropriate way to single out a winner in a runoff with 
several contenders.  
We also showed the applicability of the Next-Two rule to elections, like that to 
baseball’s Hall of Fame, in which there are a variable number of winners.  To ensure that 
this number is not too large, we illustrated how it could be modified to make it more 
selective.  A future task will be to analyze equilibrium strategies when, as with Next-
Two, the number of contenders is determined by a moving yardstick rather than one that 
is fixed, as Bouton (2011) assumes in his strategic analysis. 
In conclusion, the Next-Two rule seems a better way to narrow the field than 
setting some arbitrary vote threshold or stipulating a certain number of finalists.  It takes 
seriously the distribution of votes among candidates, which present practices do not do, 
and draws the line where there is a sufficiently large gap among the top candidates. 
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